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IN MY VIEW
SMALL ARMS POLICY
Sir:
The central thesis of the article entitled “U.S. Policy on Small Arms and Light
Weapons,” by Loretta Bondì, which appeared in the Winter 2006 edition of the
Naval War College Review, is that the U.S. system of export controls on small
arms is as good as any, and better than most other countries, but that American
moral authority in this area is undermined by its permitting widespread civilian
ownership of firearms.
The U.S. commitment to widespread firearms ownership among civilians
represents the clear preference of the American people. After passage of the
Brady Act in 1993 and the ban on the future sales of military look-alike firearms
in 1994, the next election resulted in control of both the House and the Senate
shifting to the Republican party for the first time since the Eisenhower
administration. Former president Bill Clinton himself credited the efforts of the
National Rifle Association as a significant factor in that historical electoral
turnaround.
The clear preference of the American electorate for continuing the U.S. tradi-
tion of individual armed self-defense has also been expressed in other contexts.
Throughout the 1990s and into the early 21st century, increasing numbers of
state legislatures passed laws requiring authorities to issue concealed weapons
permits to citizens who meet certain objective criteria. State legislatures are also
considering “Stand Your Ground” legislation, which recognizes a citizen’s right
to remain in any place where he or she may lawfully be and to resist aggression,
with deadly force if necessary, without any “duty to retreat” to spare attackers the
consequences of their actions. In 2004 Congress let the ban on military
look-alike firearms expire, and in 2005 it protected the firearms industry from
logic-twisting lawsuits filed by individual plaintiffs and by municipalities that
sought to hold firearms manufacturers liable for injuries associated with the use
of their products.
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If Ms. Bondì wishes to change the clear preference of the American body poli-
tic for its tradition of armed self-defense, she is free to do so through the Ameri-
can political system. But Americans who value and wish to retain a tradition of
individual armed self-defense need not submit to the emotional blackmail that
their tradition is responsible for atrocities in countries with far different politi-
cal and cultural systems.
DENNIS B. WILSON
SSGN COMMAND AND CONTROL
Sir:
In his article “SSGN: A Transformation Limited by Legacy Command and Con-
trol” in the Winter 2006 Review, Captain Charles Sykora makes the case for com-
mand of the new SSGNs harder than it need be. There are precedents for the
kinds of organizational and operational dilemmas that he creates. When nuclear
attack submarines were used in direct support of carrier task groups in the late
seventies and when ballistic missile submarines began operating in conjunction
with other forces during periods of relaxed readiness in the eighties, the poten-
tial and actual conflict of missions outlined by Captain Sykora existed, albeit not
in wartime conditions. Rather than creating elaborate hierarchies or mission
matrices or formal declarations of priorities, these operations moved the deci-
sion points that Captain Sykora assigns to the commanding officer to the next
higher level of authority. These operations were conducted under the existing
tactical rubrics, with two notable exceptions.
Competent and senior submarine officers were collocated with the tactical
and strategic operational commanders. These officers were in tactical command
of the assigned submarines or were the principal advisers on submarine matters
to the officers who had tactical command. The resulting face-to-face dialogue
between these two resolved any conflicts of orders or desired activities in mis-
sion and tactical employment of the submarines assigned. More importantly,
such assignments created a communications link—one that operated without
signals—between the submarine warfare officers at each end in their mutual
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understanding of the nature and limitations of and processes for submarine op-
erations. This not only prevented orders that could not be executed from being
formulated in the first place but also obviated any need for the submarine to re-
port routine matters.
The second aspect that at the time was novel to surface forces but routine in
submarine matters involved the communications paths for the directions to and
reports from the submarines. These paths, regardless of their origin, pass
through the submarine Broadcast Control Authority (BCA) en route to delivery
to the destination. The BCA is collocated with the command centers of the sub-
marine forces. This allowed oversight by the submarine force commanders who
were the operational commanders for the fleet commanders. This overlay could
hinder operations, in the sense that tasks from higher authority might infringe
on the tactical commander’s initiative, but the arrangement kept all the partici-
pants in the chain of command aware of the nature and priority of various mis-
sions. Conflicts in direction were avoided, and when they arose they could be
resolved quickly.
This command-and-control (C2) schema works well and smoothly where
there is an adequate doctrinal base (not necessarily technical knowledge) and a
mutual respect for the capabilities of the participants. Good communications
are essential, but as demonstrated in many exercises with submarines operating
as part of a joint force, this does not translate into the need for instantaneous
and direct connectivity.
The model outlined herein applies to other forces and situations. Arrange-
ments much like these are used in clandestine operations where communica-
tions must be intermittent and sensors remote from the operators. Key is mutual
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the forces involved. Mutual
understanding is easier in organizations with few highly professional senior de-
cision makers—that is, the Navy, Air Force, and Special Forces—than for orga-
nizations with diverse components and many junior decision partners, such as
the Army. Jointness should not be a mandate for attempts to design universal C2
processes.
W. J. HOLLAND, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
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THE NATURE OF WAR
Sir:
I fear that the statement by Rear Admiral Shuford in his recent President’s Fo-
rum (Naval War College Review, Winter 2006, pp. 11–15) that the nature of war
is changing is not in step with the way other OPMEP [Officer Professional Mili-
tary Education Policy] courses have approached this issue regarding the “nature,
character, and conduct” of war. I believe it will cause much confusion among
Naval War College graduates as they meet with peers who have graduated from
other senior service colleges or from National Defense University courses, or the
major national security studies programs with which I am familiar.
The OPMEP is pretty clear regarding the way the senior service colleges have
approached teaching the subject covering the nature, character, and conduct of
war. The “gouge” as reflected by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Thucydides, Basil Liddell
Hart, Colonel John Boyd, etc., has been that the nature of war is unchanging but
that its character (who fights and why) and its conduct (how, and where, with
what, etc.) are always changing and adapting. War’s nature is what makes the
ideas of those “old dead guys” still live.
I realize there have been several recent best-sellers proclaiming the “changing
nature of war,” but when a learned reader explores the assertions, one concludes
the author did not understand the three “faces” of war (nature, character, and
conduct) as laid out by the great writers. Please revisit the idea that the nature of
war is changing—against the idea that it is really the character and conduct of war
that have changed (and will ever do so).
DAVID K. BROWN
Dynamics Research Corporation,
supporting Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command
and Navy Warfare Development Command
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